the first engagement of the "allied" italian forces
Central Latium,
December 8th, 1943
Almost
immediately after the September 8th armistice, the "new" Italian government
of the South attempted to field a military force to fight alongside the Allies,
thereby participating in the task of freeing the rest of the "boot".
This had a political purpose: earning the new allies' trust and esteem (that
until then had been, somehow, not too high) and, if possible, a seat at the the
peace conference table that some day was going to decide about Italy's destiny.
The
1st Motorized Grouping was scraped together with the few troops still available
in the South. Most of the units had melted away in September, 1943. There were
few veterans, and new recruits still were reluctant to show up. Also, while the
Army still had depots filled with obsolete materials and moth-eaten uniforms,
serious weaponry wasn't available, and the Allies were understandably less than
ready to supply them. The Grouping was "motorized" only in theory; it
had just a handful of non-antediluvian vehicles, and very little in the way of
fuel and spare parts.
Nevertheless,
the unit was fielded as soon as it became marginally operational. Given the
lack of modern weaponry, and of tanks (even though somebody proposed to equip
the 5th Anti-Tank Battalion with nothing less than L3/35 flamethrower
tankettes…), the Italian troops were intended for use in difficult terrain,
mountain operations, trench warfare. But this was not a problem, many parts of
the Italian front offered such environments.
Therefore,
the 1st Raggruppamento Motorizzato was fielded in the lines held by the
American 36th "Texas" Infantry Division; it was going to attack the
enemy within exactly 3 months from the armistice. The Germans were blocking a
mountain pass, the Stretta di Mignano, from their positions on the Monte Lungo,
a hill that wasn't very high, but steep and barren.
The ideal way to prepare the table is to align
the bottom edge (the Italian entry edge) as a south-eastern line. This edge is
40" long. The sides of the tabletop area are 60" long.
Aligned on this tabletop, lay Monte Lungo. This
is an oblong-shaped mountain, a flattened oval, occupying most of the table
space. The south-western and north-eastern sides are very long, and
steep-sloped for a large part, especially the south-western side. The
south-eastern side is a short, steep, curved area. The first slopes in this
south-eastern area are very steep and should be placed at 10" from the
bottom line. Two elevation levels above, and within 5" from the first
elevation curve, there's point 253. Going north-west from there, there's a
one-level descent, then two other levels to climb (not too steeply) to reach
point 343. The distance between these two points is 13". After point 343,
the rest of the mountain is a flat top up to the German table edge.
To the north-east of Monte Lungo there's the
pass, one elevation level above the valley. And to the north-east of the pass,
a section of Monte Rotondo (the better part of it is off the board). A highway
goes through the pass; this is a heavily fortified area. The pass is 10"
wide; the road climbs up with two winding curves.
To the south-west of the hill there's the river
Peccia valley and the double track railway. The Peccia is a fordable narrow
stream, running through a ravine 1-2" wide. It runs just along the
south-eastern table side and within 10"-12" from it. The railway line
runs on an embankment, between the stream and the southwestern slope of Monte
Lungo; the railway starts near the center of the south-eastern edge, gently
curves around the hill and then runs straight, 2"-3" to the
north-east of the river and 2"-3" to the south-west of the first
elevation level of Monte Lungo.
Near the central part of the south-western table
edge there's a small one-level round top, 7" in diameter, Colle S.
Giacomo. This is to the south-west of the river.
The area is largely devoid of any cover, especially
in winter. The ravine of the Peccia provides cover to personnel units; this
area of the valley is dotted with a few open-wood copses, some on the left,
some on the right, and some across the ravine. Monte Lungo itself has no cover.
1) The action starts at 06.30 hours in full
darkness, max visibility 2". The first turn lasts 30 minutes. Dawn is at
07.00 hours.
2) During daylight turns, initial max visibility
is 5" because of the fog. Every
turn, starting with the 07.15 turn, there's a 30% chance of an improvement. The
initial max visibility improvement will be up to 10", and all further
improvements will also be in 5" increments. Max visibility will never
exceed 40".
3) Wheeled vehicles have their off-road rate
halved. Of course they cannot cross steep slopes or the river, and crossing any
elevation curve costs them 4".
32 turns.
The side having uncontested control of point 343
wins. Uncontested control is defined as having at least 3 stands in good
morale, entrenched within 5" from point 343, and no enemy stands within
10" from point 343. If neither side has uncontested control, the game is a
draw.
Situation: the enemy is entrenched on Monte Lungo,
dominating the valley. Your troops have just been redeployed here for this
attack.
Orders: assault Monte Lungo and clear the hill
top, occupy point 343.
Deployment: your forces enter through the
south-eastern edge; at least the whole I Battaglione must enter by turn 2. The
Reggimento HQ and the Batteria Mortai Reggimentale can either stay off board or
enter. Your off-board artillery support intended for the pre-plotted offensive
fire can fire for 3 turns, starting with turn 1. You must pre-plot all this
fire.
Intelligence: the hill is occupied by a German
Panzergrenadier battalion. This unit is understrength but well dug-in, with
many MG nests and mortar positions.
67° Reggimento Fanteria, with:
Trained, Morale 7
Comando di Reggimento, with:
1 command stand, 1 car, 1 staff telephone truck
Batteria Mortai Reggimentale, with:
2 81mm
mortar stands (ds), 2 medium trucks
I Battaglione, with:
Comando di Battaglione, with:
1
command stand, 1 car, 1 recon infantry stand
3 Compagnie di Fanteria, each with:
3
infantry stands
Compagnia Armi d'Accompagnamento, with:
2
MMG stands, 2 45mm mortar stands, 1 20mm Solothurn ATR stand
II Battaglione, with:
Comando di Battaglione, with:
1
command stand, 1 car, 1 recon infantry stand
3 Compagnie di Fanteria, each with:
3
infantry stands
Compagnia Armi d'Accompagnamento, with:
2
MMG stands, 2 45mm mortar stands, 1 20mm Solothurn ATR stand
Attached Compagnia Genieri, with:
Regular, Morale 8
1
command engineer stand, 1 engineer stand
Attached Batteria Antiaerea, with:
Regular, Morale 8
1
20L65 AAG, 1 crew stand, 1 light truck
LI Battaglione Bersaglieri, with:
Regular, Morale 8
Comando di Battaglione, with:
1 command stand, 1 car, 1 recon motorcycle SMG
stand
2 Compagnie Bersaglieri, each with:
1
command infantry stand, 2 infantry stands, 1 MMG stand
Compagnia Anticarro, with:
1
command stand, 2 47L32 anti-tank guns, 2 crew stands, 2 light trucks
11° Reggimento Artiglieria, with:
Regular, Morale 8
1 spotter stand, 1 car (directing the fire of 4
off-board 75L18 MtnGs)
Off-board artillery support (preplotted
offensive fire only), with:
3 100L16 HWRs, 3 105L28 HWRs (of the 11°
Reggimento Artiglieria);
3 105L23 HWRs (assets of the American 36th
Division)
Notes:
1) Support stands, services, and most transport
are omitted.
2) TO&E variations: the anti-tank company of
the LI Battaglione Bersaglieri can be committed as ordinary infantry, as: 1
command stand, 2 crew stands; the recon motorcycle SMG stand can be committed
on foot. Similarly, the Solothurn ATRs of the 67° were left behind, and their
crew can be committed as crew stands.
3) The 81mm MTR stands are regimental guns; they
can be left off-board.
4) The Raggruppamento HQ and staff was unable to
intervene once the attack was launched, so it is omitted here. The 67°
Reggimento HQ shouldn't be allowed to take command of the LI Bersaglieri.
5) If the 67° Reggimento HQ remains off-board,
it and its staff can give orders up to an area within 5" from the south-eastern
table edge, through the telephone staff truck. If the command stand enters the
board, it can obviously give orders within the visibility limit; while the
staff can always give orders within 5" from the table edge.
6) The attached engineers were understrength.
Situation: you are holding a blocking position
across the Stretta di Mignano, and Monte Lungo is the key feature.
Orders: hold your ground.
Deployment: all your units are entrenched. At least
two of your companies must be on Monte Lungo; the others can be where you want.
You have 6 1"x1" minefields, 6" of barbed wire and two road
obstructions to block the area of the pass; you also have 2 1"x1"
minefields you can place where you want to. The minefields must be marked.
Intelligence: as the enemy units in line in
front of your positions have changed during the night, some kind of action
seems likely.
III Abteilung, 15. Panzergrenadier Regiment,
with:
Experienced, Morale 8
Kommandostab, with:
1 command stand, 1 recon SMG patrol stand
9.-11. Kompanien, each with:
1 command grenadier stand, 1 grenadier stand, 1
weapons stand
12. Kompanie, with:
1 command stand, 1 8cm MTR stand (ds)
Off-board artillery support:
1 75L12 IG
Notes:
1) All companies are understrength.
2) Transport and anti-tank integral/dedicated
weapons/units omitted.
3) The off-board 75L12 IG is a regimental gun.
Both command stands can act as spotters and call fire from it. Each command
stand can have up to 3 geographical locations as pre-plotted defensive fire
targets. However, each time the 75L12 IG fire is requested, there's a 30%
chance it won't be available.
4) "Grenadier" stand means ROF2
infantry stand.
The I Raggruppamento Motorizzato had been taken
in line the night before, in order to participate to this attack; this meant
the Italian troops hadn't had the time to recon the area.
The movements began in full darkness, at the
same time with the artillery barrage. This barrage was heavy, but it wasn't
observed; even after dawn, the thick fog, while covering the infantry,
prevented any observation of the enemy positions.
The fog was initially welcome by the men of the
I Battaglione, 67° Reggimento, spearheading the attack, and of the Bersaglieri
companies deployed on both flanks; however, advancing across unfamiliar terrain
in such low visibility caused several problems, and, in particular, slowed the
advance. Therefore the infantrymen couldn't follow the artillery barrage very
closely.
The infantry battalion climbed the frontal steep
slopes and reached point 253 without encountering serious opposition, only a
mortar barrage they quickly crossed. Meanwhile, the 2° Compagnia Bersaglieri
advanced along the railway line, to the west of Monte Lungo, and across the
ravine of the valley bottom. They were to cover the flank of the main attack.
When the infantry began climbing towards the
real Monte Lungo height, point 343, and the Bersaglieri were approaching Colle
S. Giacomo, the small round hill between Monte Lungo and Monte Maggiore, the
fog began rising.
At this time, the Bersaglieri, and to a lesser
extent the infantry too, suffered the consequences of poor coordination in the
overall plan. The plan called for a simultaneous attack on both sides of Monte
Lungo. The US 142nd Regiment attacked on the left, on Monte
Maggiore, and the 143rd, supported by a Ranger Battalion, attacked
on the right, Monte Sammucro, a much higher and tougher mountain overlooking S.
Pietro Infine, behind the German positions.
Both American attacks were successful, but
partially. The northern and lower parts of these flanking mountains were still
in German hands. So when the visibility improved, the Bersaglieri were taken
under a long-ranged MG cross fire not only from Monte Lungo, and the Colle S.
Giacomo, but also from the slopes of Monte Maggiore. Heavy losses were taken by
the Bersaglieri, and their flanking action was blocked.
The 1° and 2° Compagnia of the 67° Reggimento
also came under fire from point 343, but notwithstanding mortar and MG fire,
closed in upon the German foxholes on point 343. After a short but violent
hand-grenade fight, they were successful in occupying a few of these positions.
But the Germans had a much stronger firepower, and their subsequent counterattack
was successful. The Italians had used their few, ineffective SRCM hand grenades
during their assault, and now only had their slow M1891 rifles, while the
Germans began their counterattack by firing rifle grenades, then closed in with
hand grenades in bundles and SMG fire. The narrow attack front and the broken,
steep terrain had prevented the Italian MG sections from being effectively
used.
Slightly to the left, near the impassable
defenses of the pass, there was the II Battaglione, 67° Reggimento. This was the reserve, and could have been used
better, even if it had taken losses from artillery fire; but its soldiers
suffered a morale setback from seeing the I forced back with severe casualties.
The 67° was able to hold point 253, but nothing more. The I Raggruppamento
Motorizzato had had 47 KIAs, 102 WIAs, and 151 MIAs.
On December 16th, 1943, the movements
and actions of all the Allied troops in the area were tightly coordinated, and,
while the Italians carried out the frontal assault, the US 142nd
Regiment advanced from Monte Maggiore across the river Peccia, threathening the
northern end of Monte Lungo and, thereby, the German withdrawal. The artillery
fire was observed and corrected when needed. The German overall situation had
worsened, too. The Germans withdrew and Monte Lungo was conquered by the
Italian troops, but a week later that first attempt.
The possibility for German cross-fires across
the valley has been omitted, both for play balance considerations and because
the fair way to include them would have been to portray a much larger action,
on Monte Lungo, Monte Maggiore and Monte Sammucro.
The 75L18 Gruppi actually fired unobserved fire
throughout the battle, like the other artillery. However, if the fog had risen
a bit more, they could have carried out observed fire.
The V Battaglione Controcarro was deployed in
overwatch and blocking positions in front of the pass; it wasn't directly
committed and is omitted from this scenario.
The rating of the German troops as Experienced
is a rough estimate; it is possible that they should be rated as Veterans.
The terrain description is a simplified version
of the real terrain.
Sources:
Giuseppe
Conti - Il Primo Raggruppamento Motorizzato (1984)
G.A.
Sheppard - The Italian Campaign 1943-1945 (1975)
Fred
Majdalany - La battaglia di Cassino (It. Transl.) (1976)